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detailed national policy statementA' It specifies in some detail the
standards to be followed by the President in administering the ESA,1'
including the duty to "be generally fair and equitable."8 5 The
amended ESA also provides explicitly for the administration of the
stabilization program." Interestingly, the amendments provide that
the APA, with the exception of the rulemaking and public informa-
tion provisions, shall not be applicable to the ESA.87 Nonetheless, it
does incorporate detailed provisions for judicial review, 8 thereby
meeting the A malgamated Meat Cutters dictum that effective judicial
review is essential. In summary, it may be said that Amalgamated
Meat. Cutters is a case in which the judiciary rendered substantial
assistance to Congress and the President in outlining the contours
necessary for proper legislation.
II. FREEDOM OF INFORMATION
DEVELOPMENTS UNDER THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT
Definition of "Agency"
The Freedom of Information Act' (FOIA) addresses itself to
"each agency ' 2 and in 1971 the courts for the first time attempted
to define that term. Although it is clear that major units, such as the
83. Id. § 4.
84. Id. § 203.
85. Id. § 203(b)(1).
86. Id. §§ 207(b)-(c).
87. Id. § 207(a). The portions of the APA which are applicable are: 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1970)
(public information, agency rules, opinions, orders, records, and proceedings); id. § 553 (rule
making); and id. § 555(e) (providing for prompt notice of denial of a written application).
88. Economic Stabilization Act Amendments of 1971, §§ 210-1i, 1971 U. S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws at 3899. Persons suffering "legal wrong" under the Act are authorized to seek
redress in any district court, regardless of the amount in controversy. ESA Amendments of 1971
§ 210(a). Exclusive appellate review is vested in a new Temporary Emergency Court of Appeals.
Id. § 211 (b). The Supreme Court may grant review by writ of certiorari. Id. § 2 11 (g).
1. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1970). For a discussion of the general operation of the Freedom of
Information Act see 1970 Duke Project 164-65 and 1969 Duke Project 72-76. See also DAVIS
(Supp. 1970) § 3A.
2. "Each agency shall make available to the public information as follows. . . ... 5 U.S.C.
§ 552(a) (1970).
3. International Paper Co. v. FPC, 438 F.2d 1349 (2d Cir. 1971); Soucie v. David, 448 F.2d
1067 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
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Federal Trade Commission or the Atomic Energy Commission, are
"agencies" within the meaning of the FOIA, the status of executive
advisory units is unclear. The FOIA itself does not contain a defini-
tion of an agency, and the APA's definition offers little aid.' There is
some indication that the courts will look to conventional attributes
of an administrative agency, such as rule-making or adjudicatory
powers,5 however, in Soucie v. David' the Court of Apbeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit refused to rely on such procedural attrib-
utes 7 and applied instead a test which requires an analysis of the
source and scope of a unit's authority.
In Soucie several conservation groups filed suit against the Office
of Science and Technology' (OST) to force public disclosure of a
study of the Supersonic Transport program prepared by OST and
ordered by the President. The lower court dismissed the action.9 Al-
though the court's reasoning is unclear, it appears to have held that
offices within the Executive Office of the President are not agencies
within the meaning of the FOIA, and even if they were such agencies,
the doctrine of executive privilege would exempt them from the cover-
age of the Act. The court of appeals reversed and remanded, holding
that the OST was an agency within the meaning.of the FOIA and that
the claim of executive privilege could be considered only if the privi-
lege was expressly invoked by the government.
The Soucie court interpreted the APA definition of
"agency" -"each authority of the Government" "-to mean any
4. "[A]gency means each authority of the Government of the- United States, whether or not
it is within or subject to review by another agency. ... 5 U.S.C. § 551(1) (1970).
5. In International Paper Co. v. FPC, 438 F.2d 1349 (2d Cir. 1971), the plaintiff requested
disclosure of certain memoranda written by the staff of the FPC and directed to the commission-
ers themselves. The plaintiff argued that the FPC staff was an independent unit and that its
memoranda were "final opinions" of an agency made available to the public by the FOIA. 5
U.S.C. § 552(a)(2)(A) (1970). The court summarily rejected that contention, relying on the fact
that the authority to make "orders" rested only with the Commission, and therefore held that
the staff could not be an independent agency. 438 F.2d at 1358-59.
6. 448 F.2d 1067 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
7. Id. at 1073.
8. The Office of Science and Technology is one oftwelve "offices" comprising the Executive
Office of the President. 1970 CONGRESSIONAL DIRE CTORY 420-25.
9. Soucie v. Dubridge, 27 AD. L.2D 379 (1970) (oral opinion unpublished in official publica-
tions), noted in 1970 Duke Project 171-73.
10. 5 U.S.C. § 551(1) (1970). This subsection specifically exempts only the following gov-
ernmental units from the Freedom of Information portion of the APA: Congress, federal courts,
and governments of territories, possessions. and the District of Columbia. Id. §§ (A)-(D).
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administrative unit with "substantial independent authority in the
exercise of specific functions."" While OST's primary function is to
provide the President with advice in matters of science and technol-
ogy, it is also responsible to Congress for independently evaluating
certain federal programs.'2 Finding that this independent grant of
authority met the requirement of its test, the court held that OST was
an agency. ' 3
The Soucie court's reliance upon the OST's authority from a
source independent of the President was misplaced. The legislative
history of the FOIA indicates that Congress intended to reveal the
operation of all governmental units, regardless of the source of their
authority," so that the "agency" determination should be made
through a functional analysis of a unit's activities rather than an
analysis of the source of the unit's authority. An executive unit which
performs a function beyond solely providing advice to the President
should be made subject to the FOIA regardless of whether that unit's
authority is derived from Congress or the President. Such an analysis
will provide reasonable assurance that the FOIA will not be indirectly
limited through definitional gymnastics. '5
Definition of "Records"
The lack of definitions within the FOIA again presented a prob-
lem in Nichols v. United States,6 where the court sought to define the
term "records." The FOIA requires that "each agency, on request
for identifiable records . . . shall make the records promptly avail-
able to any person."'17 A physician, seeking to study certain items
related to the assassination of President Kennedy, brought suit to
compel the release of, inter alia, the Oswald rifle, bullet fragments,
11. 448 F.2d at 1073.
12. Reorganization Plan No. 2 of 1962, Pt. I, § 3. 3 C.F.R. 879-80 (1959-63 Compilation).
13. The OST itself believed, in 1967, that it was subject to the FOIA. Specifically stating
that it was acting pursuant to the FOIA, it published a notice required by the Act, 5 U.S.C.
§ 552(a)(1), detailing the types of information it would make available. 32 Fed. Reg. 11060
(1967).
See also U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MEMORANDUM ON THE PUBLIC
INFORMATION SECTION OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT 4 (1967) (stating that the
FOIA applies to every "organizational unit in the executive branch").
14. Cf. H.R. REP. No. 1497 (referring to all executive branch records).
15. See generally 49 TEXAS L. REv. 780, 790 (1971).
16. 325 F. Supp. 130 (D. Kan. 1971).
17. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3) (1970).
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cartridge cases, and clothing worn by the President.'" The district
court dismissed the complaint, holding that these items were not "re-
cords" within the meaning of the FOIA. Since neither the Act nor
its legislative history offered any indication of the meaning of "re-
cords," the court looked to the statutory definition most often
adopted by agencies subsequent to the passage of the FOIA.19 While
the court refrained from making a precise interpretation of. the word.
it stressed that records generally are items which document acts and
eve ts and have knowledge or information impressed upon them. 21
Although making physical items more freely available might be desir-
able as a policy consideration, the court's result is in accordance with
congressional intent, which was directed at information relating to the
activities of an agency, and not at physical items being held or stored
by an agency.2'
Final Opinions
The FOIA provides that all final opinions and orders, as well as
statements of policy and interpretations, shall be made available to
18. 325 F. Supp. at 135-36. Plaintiff also joined the Department of the Navy, requesting
reports of medical studies performed during the Kennedy autopsy at Bethesda Naval Hospital.
The Navy submitted an affidavit declaring that the items in question had been delivered to the
United States Secret Service in 1963. The court concluded that while the medical reports were
records within the meaning of the FOIA, it could not require production of records not in the
custody of the challenged agency. Id. at 137.
19. As used in this chapter, "records" includes all books, papers, maps, photo-
graphs, or other documentary materials, regardless of form or characteristics ....
[M]useum material made or acquired and preserved solely for reference or exhibition
purposes. . .[is] not included. 44 U.S.C. § 3301 (1970).
This statute was designed to control the disposal of records throughout the government. The
definition, however, is referred to throughout the statute dealing with the handling of govern-
ment documents. See 44 U.S.C. § 3301 (1970). Many agencies have also adopted this definition.
E.g.. 41 C.F.R. § 105-60.104(2) (1971) (General Services Administration). See Comment.
Freedom of Information Act-Early Judicial Interpretations. 44 WASH. L. REv. 641, 643 n.13
(1969).
20. The court also relied upon, without explicitly .mentioning, the exemption for documents
"specifically exempted from disclosure by statute." 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3) (1970). The Kennedy
articles were stored pursuant to 44 U.S.C. §§ 2107, 2108(c) (1970). which restricted general
access to the articles until Oct. 26, 1971. Nichols was decided on Feb. 24. 1971.
21. Note, Comments on Proposed Amendments to Section 3 of the Administrative Proce-
dure Act: The Freedom of Information Bill. 40 NOTiE DAME LAW. 417 (1965). See H.R. REP.
No. 1497, at 1. 3.6.
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the public. 22 Where agencies issue orders without an opinion or with
only a short summary statement, attempts are made to use the FOIA
as a tool for unearthing the policies underlying such orders. An early
case. American Mail Line v. Gulick,23 held that where an agency
expressly bases its decision on an undisclosed staff memorandum, that
document is no longer protected by the intra-agency exemption 2' and
must be disclosed. 25 This holding was expanded in 1971 by two princi-
pal cases, Grumman Aircraft Engineering Corp. v. Renegotiation
Board" and Sterling Drug, Inc. v. FTC.27
In Grumman the court held that where the Contract Renegotia-
tion Board adopts a recommendation of a subordinate group in a
summary order and that recommendation is transmitted to the Board
along with a report containing the facts and reasoning relied upon by
the subordinate group. the report must be disclosed as the "final
opinion." Disclosure was required even though the summary order
22.
(2) Each agency, in accordance with published rules, shall make available for
public inspection and copying-
(A) final opinions, including concurring and dissenting opinions, as well as
orders made in the adjudication of cases;
(B) those statements of policy and general interpretations which have been
adopted by the agency and are not published in the Federal Register. 5 U.S.C.
§ 552(a)(2) (1970).
23. 411 F.2d 696 (D.C. Cir. 1969). noted in 1969 Duke Project 87.
24. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5) (1970).
25. In Gulick the Maritime Subsidy Board stated in an order that it had relied solely upon
a particular staff memorandum in reaching its conclusions. The Board released only the last
five pages of the memorandum as its official opinion. The appellate court held that the entire
document was, in fact, the final opinion and ordered release pursuant to 5 U.S.C.
§ 552(a)(2)(A) (1970) (see note 22 supra for the text of this provision). The Board's lack of
enthusiastic support for the Gulick decision is amply demonstrated in Grace Lines. Inc. v.
Bethlehem Steel Corp.. Petition for Reconsideration. 28 AD. L.2D 195 (Maritime Subsidy Bd.
1971).
26. 325 F. Supp. 1146 (D.D.C. 1971). This action was on remand to determine whether the
documents in question constituted final opinions. If the district court so determined, it had been
ordered by the appellate court to release the documents after deleting any trade secrets or
confidential information. 425 F.2d 578 (D.C. Cir. 1970). See 1970 Duke Project 174-75.
'After the decision to remand was made, but prior to the district court hearing, the Board
amended its regulations concerning the availability of information, The previous regulation
simply stated that "final opinions" and "'statements of general applicability" would be publicly
available. 32 C.F.R. § 1480.5 (1971). The amended regulation provides for the availability or
the records of certain agency actions (e.g.. letters not to proceed. orders determining excessive
profits). as well as any "Interpretations." "General Orders.~ or -Administrative Orders" that
affect the public. 36 Fed. Reg. 3808 (1971).
27. 450 F.2d 698 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
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contained no reference to the report. In fact it was the policy of the
Board to specify that adoption of the recommendation did not imply
adoption of the report.
Operating within an atypical infrastructure, the Contract Renego-
tiation Board, rather than requesting an advisory staff memorandum.
first considers cases in a regional board which prepares a confidential
recommendation and report. The national board then either approves
the recommendation or substitutes its own conclusion. The Board
also may appoint a committee of Board members to study and make
a second confidential recommendation and report to the full Board.
In either case, as noted, approval of a recommendation does not imply
"adoption" of its accompanying report.2 The Grumman court or-
dered that whenever the Board approves the recommendation of a
regional board or committee without opinion, the accompanying re-
port must be disclosed as a "final opinion" under the FOIA.
Although the reasoning of the court in Grumman is unclear-the
result is correct. The "final opinion" provision of the FOIA is meant
to prevent an agency from developing and applying a body of law
without revealing that law to persons outside the agency. '9 When the
Board adopts a recommendation accompanied by a report, it is ex-
tremely likely that the report will be relied upon by the Board and its
staff in subsequent proceedings.
The court properly rejected the Board's argument that the adop-
tion of a recommendation might be based on reasons entirely indepen-
dent of those given in a report. Such an event is unlikely to occur. It
might also be argued that the practical effect of the Grumman holding
is to force the Board to either stand by the reasoning contained in the
report or write its own final opinion. Arguably such a result would
be inconsistent with Congress* intent to avoid overburdening agencies
with the need to write opinions." However, the improbability of the
Board's adopting a recommendation while rejecting the reasoning
upon which that recommendation was based makes it doubtful that
Grumman will overburden the Board.
The Grumman court also held that a report submitted by a Board
28. 325 F. Supp. at 1148-52.
29. "The governing principle [of the Act]. which I think is without exception. is that secret
la% is [orbidden." DAVIS (Supp. 1970) 159. See Sterling Drug., Inc. v. FTC, 450 F.2d 698, 712
(D.C. Cir. 1971) (Bazelon. C.J.. dissenting in part).
30. Set, 450 F.2d 698. 707.
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committee or even an individual member of the Board must be dis-
closed. Such a report represents the opinion of at least one Board
member and thus constitutes a concurring or dissenting opinion made
equally available by the FOIA.2'
In the second case, Sterling,32 the Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit ordered release of a memorandum transmitted
by the Federal Trade Commission to its staff in explanation of a
summary order shortly after that order had been issued. even though
such an intra-agency memorandum would ordinarily be exempt from
the Act's disclosure requirements. 33 The Commission had issued a
complaint alleging that Sterling Drug, Inc.. in acquiring Lehn & Fink
Products Corp.. had violated section 7 of the Clayton Act.3" While
this case was pending the Commission approved, in a summary order.
a merger between two other firms. Sterling felt that the circumstances
of the approved merger were similar to those upon which its alleged
violation was based. After failing to obtain the desired information
in discovery proceedings, Sterling filed suit under the FOIA to obtain
disclosure of documents relating to both mergers. including (1)
memoranda prepared by the Commission staff both before and after
the issuance of the summary order; (2) memoranda prepared by two
individual commissioners; and (3) a memorandum issued by the Com-
mission itself to the staff after the issuance of the summary order.
Sterling, cited Gulick. 5 argued that such memoranda constituted
final agency opinions and should be made available pursuant to the
FOIA. 6 The lower court inspected the documents in camera, and
concluded that all the memoranda were protected from disclosure by
the intra-agency memorandum exemption. The circuit court affirmed
as to the memoranda prepared by the staff and the two individual
31. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(2)(A) (1970).
32. 450 F.2d 698.
33. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5) (1970).
34. 15 U.S.C. § 1.8 (1970).
35. American Mail Line v. Gulick. 411 F.2d 696 (D.C. Cir. 1969). See note 23 supra and
accompanying text.
36. Sterling also argued that. as a policy matter, disclosure was warranted in this and like
cases because it would have the beneficial effect of encouraging agencies to issue opinions with
every order. The court considered this request unrealistic when applied to the huge volume of
orders and licenses issued by agencies. 450 F.2d at 707 & n.9. The Court's point. ho%ever. is
not well taken, at least under the circumstances present in this case, because the FTC issues
'relatively few orders concerning divestiture proposals. Id. at 714-15 n. 13 (Bazelon. C.J.. dissent-
ing in part).
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commissioners, but reversed and remanded as to the memorandum
issued by the entire Commission.
Requiring the release of the memorandum issued by the entire
Commission to its staff is clearly a correct decision. As discussed
earlier 37 such documentation of agency policy, setting forth a body
of substantive law to be applied by the agency, is precisely the type
of information which Congress intended should be made available to
the public under the final opinion provisions of the FOIA. Where such
memoranda follow closely after a Commission order, they very likely
constitute what would normally be considered part of a final opin-
ion.3 1
The court's refusal to release the two memoranda written by indi-
vidual commissioners, however, is troublesome. The exact nature of
the memoranda is not made clear in the opinion, but they appear to
have been directed to the staff and to have been written for the pur-
pose of comparing the earlier merger with the Sterling merger. The
court felt that these memoranda should not be released because they
would reveal information concerning a pending decision and also
because they might not accurately reflect the reasoning of the entire
Commission since they contained only an individual commissioner's
reasons for his vote. In relying upon this second point the court is in
error. A memorandum which expresses a commissioner's reasoning
for his vote would constitute a concurring or dissenting opinion which
must also be disclosed.39 In regard to the court's first concern, if such
a memorandum dealt with another case under consideration, those
portions could be deleted before release."
37. See note 29 supra and accompanying text.
38. Although the court did not discuss the point, a time element must be considered here.
If the memoranda were written within a reasonable time following the decision, they should be
characterized as part of an opinion; however, with the passage of time, a commissioner's
explanation would inevitably begin to reflect events which would have occurred subsequent to
the decision.
39. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(2)(A) (1970); Grumman Aircraft Eng'r Corp. v. Renegotiation Bd.,
325 F. Supp. 1146, 1152 (D.D.C. 1971). See text accompanying note 31 supra. See S. REP. No.
813, at 7.
40. The guideline established in Soucie v. David, 448 F.2d 1067, 1077-78 (D.C. Cir. 1971),
permitting nondisclosure of nonexempt information only when inextricably intertwined with
exempt material, would also be appropriate in a case where a commissioner's reasons for a past
vote are intertwined in a discussion of pending matters.
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Equitable Discretion
In a widely criticized 1969 decision,4' Consumers Union v. Veter-
ans Administration4 2 it was held that, even where there was no applic-
able statutory exemption under the FOIA, a court had equitable dis-
cretion to decline to force an agency to disclose. 3 In 1971, one court
of appeals expressed disagreement with that holding in dicta,44 and in
Getman v. NLRB 5 the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit purported to reach a holding opposite to that in Consumers
Union. 6
The FOIA states that "[t]he district court. . shall have jurisdic-
tion to enjoin the agency from the withholding of agency records
. .- The Consumers Union court, relying on the use of the word
"shall," read this language to be permissive rather than mand~itory.
The court, citing but one case to support its position,"8 went on to
41. See 1969 Duke Project 95-98; Note, Judicial Discretion and the Freedom of Information
Act, 45 IND. L.J. 421 (1970); 44 TuLANE L. REv. 800 (1970).
42. 301 F. Supp. 796 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), dismissed as moot, 436 F.2d 1363 (2d Cir. 1971).
43. Consumers Union filed an appeal from that decision, but before the hearing was held
the Veterans Administration retroactively altered its contract solicitation policy to permit dis-
closure of test data of this type. 436 F.2d at 1364. The counsel for Consumers Union in that
action appeared as amicus curiae in Getman v. NLRB, 450 F.2d 670 (D.D.C. 1971). He stated
that the issue of equitable discretion was neither briefed nor argued by either party in Consumers
Union. Id. at 678 n.25.
44. Soucie v. David, 448 F.2d 1067, 1076 (D.C. Cir. 1971). See also the language in Well-
ford v. Hardin, 444 F.2d 21, 24 (4th Cir. 1971), relied on by both the Soucie and the Getnan
courts. Their reliance is questionable because the Wellford decision does not directly discuss the
possibility of exercising equitable discretion and the point does not appear to have been argued.
But see Long v. IRS, P-H 1972 FED. TAXES 72-349 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 23, 1971). The court
refused to employ its "equity powers" to disclose certain tax files when the files were available
through related litigation in the Tax Court. Id. V 72-350. As noted, there is no statutory basis
for such a refusal; nor is the fact that the material may be otherwise obtainable relevant to the
determination of whether or not a given record is exempt.
45. 450 F.2d 670 (D.C. Cir. 1971), noted in 1971 U. ILL. L.F. 329.
46. Unfortunately the Getman decision is not strong authority for the issue as the court
clearly had a narrower alternative rationale available. The district court granted the plaintiff's
petition for disclosure holding that, even assuming it did have discretion to exercise equitable
jurisdiction under the FOIA, it would decline to exercise that discretion because the ggverntant
had failed to show any danger of significant harm. The court of appeals affirmed the lower
court's decision to disclose, but, dodging the easier issue and refusing to rely on the govern-
ment's failure, went straight to the jurisdictional issue. 450 F.2d at 677-78.
47. Administrative Procedure Act § 3(c), 80 Stat. 250 (1966), superseded by 81 Stat. 54
(1967) (emphasis added). The clause in question was altered slightly when the Act was codified:
"[Tihe district court . . . has jurisdiction to enjoin ...." 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3) (1970) (em-
phasis added). See DAvis (Supp. 1970) 35-36 (criticizing the codification of the APA).
48. Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 326-31 (1944), holding that the Government, having
established a violation of practices prohibited by the statute, was not entitled to an injunction
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establish a test whereby an agency must show that disclosure will
result in significantly greater harm than good before a court may deny
a petition to disclose.
Support for the Consumers Union holding can be found in the
Supreme Court statement that whenever Congress intends to deprive
the courts of their jurisdiction to exercise equitable discretion it must
make "an unequivocal statement" of that intent.49 The requirement
for an "unequivocal statement," however, was clarified in United
States v. DuPont & Co.: 5
Congress would not be deemed to have restricted the broad remedial powers
of courts of equity without explicit language doing so in terms, or some other
strong indication of intent.5'
The languge of the FOIA fulfills this requirement and compels the
conclusion that the FOIA does not grant equitable jurisdiction: "This
section does not authorize withholding of information . . . except as
specifically stated in this section. '52
The history of the FOIA makes it further evident that Congress
itself performed the necessary balancing of equities and intended that
the only authority for denying information to the public is to be found
in the FOIA.0 The former Public Information Section of the APA 4
limited both the parties who could obtain information and the kinds
of information available. These limitations led Congress to believe
that a major shift in emphasis was necessary. It therefore attempted
as of right. The language of the statute was similar to the FOIA: "[U]pon a showing. . . that
such person has . . . or is about to engage in any such acts or practices a permanent or
temporary injunction, restraining order, or other order shall be granted. ... Emergency
Price Control Act, 56 Stat. 23, § 205(a) (1942) (emphasis added). But see United Steelworkers
v. United States, 361 U.S. 39, 55-59 (1959) (Frankfurter & Harlan, J.J., concurring) holding
that an injunction is mandatory against a strike that would cause a national emergency even
though the applicable statute used the word "shall." See Note, Judicial Discretion, supra note
41, for a discussion of the two cases.
49. Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 328 (1944).
50. 366 U.S. 316 (1961).
51. Id. at 328 n.9 (emphasis added).
52. 5 U.S.C. § 552(c) (1970) (emphasis added). But see DAVIS (Supp. 1970) 177. Davis
interprets the "specifically" clause as only limiting the courts' power to interpret the language
of the exemptions to the literal meaning of the words used by Congress. Id. As indicated by
the Soucie and Getman decisions, this interpretation has not been accepted.
53. See Note, Judicial Discretion, supra note 41, at 430-31; 44 TuLANE L. REv., supra note
41, at 805.
54. Public Information Act, ch. 324, § 3, 60 Stat. 238 (1946), as amended, 5 U.S.C. § 552
(1970).
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to provide "clearly delineated statutory language." 55 To allow the
courts to perform their own balancing of equities would, in the words
of the Getman court, seriously undermine "the overriding purpose of
the Act . . . to require disclosure in all but a narrow and clearly
defined category of situations." 6 There may be isolated instances in
which disclosure would cause more harm than would nondisclosure,"1
yet, rather than sanction the continued existence of a vague undefined
ground for nondisclosure,58 Congress has accepted the costs in ex-
change for the benefits it believed would be derived from the FOIA.
Legislative History
Legislative history in the form of committee reports often prov-
ides valuable guidance to courts in the construction and interpretation
of vague or ambiguous statutory language. Conflicting interpreta-
tions given in the House and Senate reports to the FOIA, however,
have multiplied the usual difficulties of divining congressional intent. 0
The Senate report generally contains statements compatible with the
language of the Act and tends to construe the Act in favor of broad
disclosure. The House report, on the other hand, often conflicts with
the express language of the Act and tends to restrict disclosure.6"
55. S. REp. No. 813, at 3. But see DAvis (Supp. 1970) 123-24, See also Soucie v. David,
448 F.2d 1067, 1076 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Comment, Freedom ofInformation Act, supra note 19,
at 663 n.98.
56. 450 F.2d at 679 n.31. It is arguable whether Congress was successful in making the
exemptions "clearly delineated"; however, the "specifically" clause, 5 U.S.C. § 552(c)( 1970),
appears to be an example of clarity, Prof. Davis' analysis notwithstanding, see note 52 supra,
and the effect of that clause clearly was ignored by the Consumers Union court in deciding the
issue of equitable discretion. See 448 F.2d at 1077; Wellford v. Hardin, 444 F.2d 21, 24 (4th
Cir. 1971).
57. The Soucie court left open a possibility that an unusual factual circumstance might
occur which would justify a revival of the equitable discretion doctrine. 448 F.2d at 1077. The
same court, however, disavowed the existence of such discretion in Getman. 450 F.2d at 679
n.31.
58. S. REp. No. 813, at 3.
59. E.g., DAVIS (Supp. 1970) 31; Comment, The Freedom of Information Act: Access to
Law, 36 FORD. L. REV. 765 (1968); see Note, Comments on Proposed Amendments, supra note
21 (an analysis of the early legislative history of the Act). For a complete list of the documents
comprising the legislative history of the FOIA, see DAVIS (Supp. 1970) 116 n.6.
60. For example, in regard to the scope of the exemptions, the Senate report clearly states
that it is the Act's purpose "to establish a general philosophy of full agency disclosure unless
information is exempted under clearly delineated statutory language." S. REP. No. 813, at 3
(emphasis added). The House report, H.R. REP. No. 1497, however, repeatedly describes the
scope of the exemptions in terms which enlarge their coverage far beyond the express language
of the Act. See DAvis (Supp. 1970) 174-75.
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The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit exam-
ined this problem in two cases in 1971, stating in Soucie1 and
Getman62 that whenever resort to the conflicting reports was necessary
the Senate report was to be preferred. 3 The House report was actually
published after the Senate's passage of the FOIA.64 Since the Senate
report was the only one available for consideration by both houses, it
is "a better indicator of legislative intent."65
These decisions indicate that, the Senate report will be preferred
when the reports conflict. No court has yet discussed the situation
where the Senate report is silent on an issue and the House report is
contrary to the thrust of the Act. In this situation, enforcement of the
Act, consistent with the purpose of the statute, dictates that the House
interpretation should be disregarded.
An extreme example can be found in the respective paragraphs discussing the exemption for
matters "relating solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of an agency." 5 U.S.C.
§ 552(b)(2) (1970). The House report explicitly states that the exemption does not cover matters
of internal management such as employee relations and working conditions; however, the report
states that operating rules, guidelines, and manuals of procedure for government investigators
or examiners would be exempt. The Senate report, in contrast, lists examples covered by the
exemption as regulations concerning lunch hours, parking facilities, and sick leave. Admittedly
it is difficult to understand why such mundane matters were exempted, but at least the Senate
report is faithful to the statutory language.
The reasons for the divergent views expressed in the two reports is not entirely clear. A widely
held view, however, is that the House committee, under pressure from agency supporters to
amend the bill, chose the easier course of writing restrictions into the legislative history. E.g.,
DAVIS (Supp. 1970) § 3A.2, at 117; Note, The Freedom of Information Act: A Critical View,
38 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 150, 153 (1969); 83 HARV. L. REV. 928, 930 n.15 (1970).
Unfortunately the major result of this "rewriting" is to reduce the effectiveness of the FOIA.
Maximum feasible disclosure will be attained only when the agencies are convinced that a court
action will inevitably result in disclosure of the information in question. So long as possibility
remains that a court will accept a particularly restrictive phrase from the House report, agencies
will resist disclosure of items which were not meant to be exempt.
61. 448 F.2d at 1077 n.39.
62. 450 F.2d at 673 n.8.
63. The conflict in both cases concerned the issue of whether Congress intended to grant
jurisdiction to exercise equitable jurisdiction. See notes 41-58 supra and accompanying text.
While the Senate report characteristically failed to deal directly with the issue, the committee's
attitude is evident from its description of the "specifically" clause. See note 52 supra and
accompanying text. The report states that all materials are to be made available "unless
explicitly allowed to be kept secret by one of the exemptions ...." S. REP. No. 813, at 10.
The House report, however, blithely comments that a court will have the authority to enjoin an
agency "whenever [the court] considers such action equitable and appropriate." H.R. REP. No.
1497, at 9 (emphasis added).
64. The Senate passed the FOIA on Oct. 13, 1965. The House report was ordered to be
printed May 9, 1966.
65. 448 F.2d at 1077 n.39; accord, 450 F.2d at 673 n.8.
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Release of Documents Under § 552(a)(2) and (3)
In City of Concord v. Ambrose" a police officer and his city
government were denied access to texts used-by the Bureau of Cus-
toms to train federal law enforcement officers. The court, in a persu-
asively written opinion, first expressly recognized that Congress had
created a presumption in favor of free disclosure and that the burden
of defeating that presumption was on the Government. However, the
court then determined that release of material pertaining to law en-
forcement would always be detrimental to the public good, thus effec-
tively creating a category of material which carries a presumption
against free disclosure. 7 The plaintiffs sought release under either
section (a)(2), requiring that an agency have available for public
inspection administrative staff manuals which affect a member of the
public,6" or section (a)(3), requiring that an agency make all material
not otherwise covered by the preceding sections available upon re-
quest." The court correctly noted that the term "administrative" was
deliberately used in section (a)(2) to exclude staff manuals pertaining
to "law enforcement matters ' 7 and held that the texts sought were
materials which fell within this excluded category. The cburt then
erroneously reasoned that in order to "preserve the detailed scheme
of classification ' 7 1 of the FOIA, it was necessary to construe section
(a)(3) as establishing a separate category of information. The court
felt that material in this last category, which the FOIA requires to
be made available only upon request, was mutually exclusive of any
66. 333 F. Supp. 958 (N.D. Cal. 1971).
67. The court relied on statements in the House and Senate reports which indicated, to the
court, that confidentiality was legitimate "when disclosure would harm the 'government's case
in court.'" 333 F. Supp. at 959; see S. REP. No. 813, at 2 (Amendment No. 1), 9; H.R. REP.
No. 1497, at 7, 10.
68. Each agency. . . shall make available for public inspection and copying-
(C) administrative staff manuals and instructions to staff that affect a member of
the public;. . . 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(2) (1970).
In Long v. IRS, supra note 44, the court denied a government motion to dismiss a request
for "an IRS manual and certain 'code books.'" P-H 1972 FED. TAXES T 72-350 (W.D. Wash.
Nov. 23, 1971).
69. Except with respect to the records made available under paragraphs (1) and (2)
of this subsection, each agency, on request for identifiable records . . . shall make the
records promptly available to any person. . . . 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3) (1970).
70. S. REP. No. 813, at 2 (Amendment No. l).See DAVIS (Supp. 1970) 136-37.
71. 333 F. Supp. at 960.
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material referred to by section (a)(2).72 The court then, with a trick
of verbal legerdemain, concluded that since the requested manuals
were exclusively dealt with by section (a)(2) they could not be released
under section (a)(3), and since the manuals pertained to law enforce-
ment rather. than purely administrative matters they could not be
released under section (a)(2).
The court misunderstood the purpose of the separation of materi-
als made by sections (a)(2) and (3). Section (a)(3) is, in effect, a
catchall clause designed to make material in general available upon
request. Section (a)(2) delineates certain specific categories of records
which must be accorded a more particularized treatment-a subdivi-
sion of records which must be indexed and maintained available for
public inspection and copying. The A mbrose court evaded section
(a)(3)'s explicit directive that any material not already made available
by previous sections must be made available upon request, subject
only to the specific exemptions found in section (b). 73
National Defense and Executive Privilege
In Soucie v. David 4 the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit, remanding a refusal to release an Office of Science
and Technology report on the Supersonic Transport controversy, es-
tablished in dicta guidelines for deciding anticipated arguments for
nondisclosure based on executive privilege and the exemption for mat-
ters involving national defense or foreign policy.75 The court indicated
that if either claim was accepted, an in camera inspection would be
necessary to separate and release any unprotected information unless
the Government could describe the report's relevant features suffi-
ciently to justify the claim, in which case the district court should
forego the inspection and allow the entire report to be withheld. The
court did not detail a standard for a "sufficient" description but did
cite Epstein v. Resor,76 implying that an in camera inspection would
72. Cf. ATrORNEY GENERAL'S MEMORANDUM, supra note 13, at 15, 23. But ee DAVIS
(Supp. 1970) 133 n.40.
73. The court did briefly examine two of the specific exemptions in relation to the material
requested here but, in view of its holding, did not think it necessary to base its decision upon
either exemption. 333 F. Supp. at 960.
74. 448 F.2d 1067 (D.C. Cir. 1971). See also text accompanying note 6 supra.
75. "[Matters] specifically required by Executive order to be kept secret in the interest . of
the national defense or foreign policy." 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1) (1970).
76. 421 F.2d 930 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 965 (1970).
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be improper so long as the government's claim was not arbitrary and
capricious. Application of this standard would weaken the utility of
the FOIA by decreasing the likelihood of an in camera inspection and
the release of any information whatever. This aspect of the Soucie
decision appears to underline, albeit in a less dramatic tone than
Epstein, the continuing concern of the courts that they may intrude
into an area where judicial expertise would be inadequate to prevent
irreparable damage to the national interest.7"
In Mink v. EPA,7" it was held that the FOIA abrogated that
portion of an Executive Order which granted to an entire document
the same security classification as that of the most highly classified
component part.7 The lower court, in an action brought by a group
of Congressmen, had refused to disclose a collection of documents
compiled as a report by the National Security Council concerning the
Amchitka nuclear test," holding that such a compilation was pro-
tected by the national defense exemption. 8 Stating that "[s]ecrecy by
association is not favored,"12 the circuit court reversed, ordering the
release of all documents which would not be classified if they were
separated from the compilation. The FOIA exempts only matter
"specifically required . . . to be kept secret . . .,,13 and the court
believed that the group-classification scheme was not sufficiently spe-
cificAm Blanket classification represents a return to procedures fol-
77. See generally United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. I (1953).
78. .... F.2d- (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. granted, 40 U.S.L.W. 3428 (U.S. Mar. 17, 1972)
(No. 71-909).
79. Exec. Order No. 10,501, 3 C.F.R. 292 (1971). See generally 83 HARV. L. REv. 928
(1970).
80. Apparently no attempt was made to deny that the National Security Council was an
agency. Cf Soucie v. David, 448 F.2d 1067, 1072 (D.C. Cir. 1971). See notes 10-15 supra and
accompanying text.
81. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1) (1970).
82. _F.2d at -
83. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1) (1970) (emphasis added).
84. Since this appeal had been taken from a summary dismissal, the Mink court declined
to answer plaintiffs' challenge of the government's entire scheme for the security classification
of documents as set out in Executive Order 10501. That system allows the heads of specified
executive units to delegate to subordinates the authority to classify any documents or records
which, in the subordinate's opinion, were either "vital," "important," or "prejudicial" to the
national defense. As this article went to print, Executive Order 11652, 37 Fed. Reg. 5209 (1972),
was issued, revoking Executive Order 10501 and providing for more limited delegation of
authority to classify materials as well as reducing the number of agencies authorized to classify
documents "Top Secret" or "Secret."
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lowed before the Public Information Section of the APA8 5 was re-
pealed by the FOIA and is antithetical to the philosophy underlying
the FOIA. 6
The problem of how to handle a claim of executive privilege was
presented in Committee for Nuclear Responsibility, Inc. v. Seaborg,8
a case in which the plaintiffs were seeking through discovery tech-
niques many of the same documents sought in Mink through the
FOIA. Each of the agency heads involved had made a determination
that the disclosure of the documents, even to the judge for in camera
inspection, would be contrary to the public interest. The Government
argued that the doctrine of "true" executive privilege prevented a
court from reviewing those determinations. The court rejected this
argument8 s and held that the district court should conduct an in cam-
era review.
It is clear from the decisions in Soucie, Mink and Nuclear Re-
sponsibility that any claim of executive privilege will be tested by the
courts at least to assure that the claim is neither arbitrary nor capri-
cious. However, it is also clear that the essential thrust of the
FOIA-full disclosure unless the Government shows good cause not
to reveal-will not be applied to the national defense exemption. Even
the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, heretofore
given to expansive readings of the disclosure provisions of the Act,89
reads that exemption as necessarily differing in tone from the remain-
der of the FOIA due to the character of the information protected.
85. Public Information Act, ch. 324, § 3, 60 Stat. 238 (1946), as amended, 5 U.S.C. § 552
(1970).
86. A problem may arise, however, where the relationship of the documents brought to-
gether in a given report may be revealing in and of itself. In such cases a possible solution,
suggested in Epstein v. Resor, 421 F.2d 930, 933 (9th Cir. 1970), in a slightly different context,
would be to permit the Government to classify the documents in question so long as its determi-
nation that a compromise of security might otherwise occur is not found by the court to be
arbitrary or capricious. A scheme such as this would seem to satisfy the requirement of the
FOIA that in order to qualify for an exempt status a document must be one which is "specifi-
cally" required to be kept secret-"specifically" meaning, arguably, requiring a document to
be given individual consideration. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1) (1970).
87. F.2d- (D.C. Cir. 1971).
88. The court tartly commented that, in its view, "this claim of absolute immunity for
documents in possession of an executive department or agency, upon the bald assertion of its
head, is not sound law." Id. at -
89. See. e.g., Sterling Drug, Inc. v. FTC, 450 F.2d 698 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Soucie v. David,
448 F.2d 1067 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Bristol-Myers Co. v. FTC, 424 F.2d 935 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 824 (1970).
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Intra-agency Memorandum Exemption
In Sterling Drug, Inc. v. FTC the court held that memoranda
prepared by the FTC staff during a merger investigation were ex-
empted from the FOIA by the intra-agency exemption.9 That exemp-
tion is applicable only if the memoranda "would not be available by
law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency.""2
Acknowledging that the clause is not clear, the court nonetheless held
that the proper interpretation was that found in the House report:
"[A]ny internal memoranda which would routinely be disclosed to a
private party through the discovery process in litigation with the
agency . . . ."' Although it might appear that this interpretation
would block access to virtually all agency memoranda, two alterna-
tive techniques for disclosure reduce its impact. First, memoranda
comprising part of a final opinion, as defined in Gulick,94 Grumman,"5
and Sterling," cannot be classified as intra-agency memoranda.9" Sec-
ond, memoranda not written during the decision-formulating process
that the exemption was designed to protect98 are not intra-agency
memoranda in the sense Congress used the term, and therefore are not
exempt. With the availability of these alternative means of disclosure,
Sterling's "routinely discoverable" test is a workable one. Coupled
with in camera inspections for the separation and release of factual
data contained in documents,99 this test should prevent interference
90. 450 F.2d 698 (D.C. Cir. 1971). See also notes 32-40supra and accompanying text.
91. "[1]nter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would nit be available
by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency." 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5)
(1970).
92. Id.
93. H.R. REP. No. 1497, at 10. In International Paper Co. v. FPC, 438 F.2d 1349 (2d
Cir. 1971), the court indicated that it would also require plaintiffs to show a "compelling need"
for requested intra-agency memoranda. Id. at 1359. It is clear, however, that such a require-
ment would be erroneous. Congress intended that the needs of a particular litigant must no
longer be considered. S. REp. No. 813, at 10; H.R. REP. No. 1497, at 5-6; DAvIs (Supp. 1970)
120.
94. 411 F.2d 696. See notes 23-25 supra and accompanying text.
95. 325 F. Supp. 1146. See notes 26-31 supra and accompanying text.
96. 450 F.2d 698. See notes 32-40 supra and accompanying text.
97. See notes 22-40 supra and accompanying text.
98. See H.R. REP. No. 1497, at 9; S. REp. No. 813, at 10. See also DAVIs (Supp. 1970)
157.
99. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit elaborated on the procedure
for in camera inspections in Soucie v. David, 448 F.2d 1067 (D.C. Cir. 1971), stating that a
court should refuse to release factual data only if it was "so inextricably intertwined with policy
making processes" that public disclosure would expose the mental processes of an executive
officer. Id. at 1077-78. The same court, in Sterling, made it clear that whenever factual material
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with the deliberative process"' and yet assure that the goals of the
FOIA are accomplished.
Personnel and Medical Files Exemption
The FOIA exempts from its disclosure requirements "personnel
and medical files and similarfiles" if their disclosure "would consti-
tute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy." 10' In
Getman v. NLRB'12 the Court of Appeals for the District of C61um-
bia Circuit ordered the NLRB to disclose to certain plaintiffs lists
containing the names and addresses of employees eligible to vote in
thirty-five upcoming representation elections, holding that under the
specific circumstances of the case such a disclosure would not "con-
stitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy." 113 The
plaintiffs in the case were labor law specialists who intended to use
the "Excelsior lists" ' to conduct a study of the elections." 5 The court
might be present, the district court must state in its opinion that an inspection was made and
consideration given its release. 450 F.2d at 704. See Bristol-Myers Co. v. FTC, 424 F.2d 935,
939 (D.C. Cir. 1970); 425 F.2d at 582.
100. See generally S. REP. No. 813, at 9.
101. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (6) (1970) (emphasis added).
102. 450 F.2d 670.
103. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6) (1970).
104. Lists of names and home addresses of employees eligible to vote must be made avail-
able to the union prior to representation election. See Excelsior Underwear Inc., 156 N.L.R.B.
1236 (1966).
105. Approximately 15,000 elections will be held during the two-year period of the study.
450 F.2d at 676. The court declined to express an opinion as to what it might have decided if
the request had been for lists from every election during the test period. The concurring opinion
expressed a fear that the case would cause agencies to be overburdened with requests for lists
and collections of data. Id. at 680-81. The possibility that an agency might be overburdened
seems slight in that the fees charged will mount with the volume requested, thus providing a
self-limiting factor in most cases. See, for example, the proposed information retrieval fees for
the Office of Education, HEW: $5.00/hr/clerical worker, plus hourly cost and overhead for all
professional or supervisory personnel, plus all copying fees. 36 Fed. Reg. 20612 (1971). While
an agency should utilize those fees to allocate sufficient resources to promptly handle the
ordinary flow of requests, a very large and unusual request need not necessarily require more
than a good faith effort to provide the materials as expeditiously as the agency's resources
permit.
The concurring opinion also disagreed with the release of the lists because, in its opinion,
the FOIA was not intended to apply to information about private parties but rather was
intended to apply only to information about government activities which is necessary to properly
evaluate governmental performance. Although this does appear to have been the Act's primary
purpose, the language of the Act contains no such limitation. The majority opinion, noting that
the lists sought in this case were related to such an evaluation, stated that "the Act is not limited
to disclosures involving public scrutiny of governmental operations." 450 F.2d at 680 n.33.
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assumed, without an explicit holding, that the lists came within the
meaning of "similar files" and centered its discussion upon whether
disclosure would be an unwarranted invasion of the employees' per-
sonal privacy. Finding that the wording of this exemption, in contrast
with the other exemptions, required an inquiry into the needs of the
plaintiff,'6 the court stated that an agency could refuse to disclose
such information only when the damage caused by the invasion of
privacy clearly outweighed the benefits that would accrue to the gen-
eral public if the information were released. Thus, a case by case
inquiry is always necessary to determine the qualifications and need
of each requesting party, and after disclosure an implicit limitation
is always present as to the use of the information and the persons who
may have access to it.'0 7
Investigatory Files Exemption
Wellford v. Hardin,0 5 an important 1970 decision, was affirmed
by the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.' 9 The plaintiff in that
case was attempting to force the Department of Agriculture to pro-
duce warning letters sent to non-federally inspected meat and poultry
producers suspected of engaging in interstate commerce. The Depart-
ment argued that the warning letters were part of an investigatory file
106. The intent of Congress to preclude examination of the need of a person requesting
information (with the noted exception of the exemption under discussion) is plainly evident.
Nonetheless, agencies continue to inquire into the needs of such persons as well as facts support-
ing the request; furthermore, many agencies condition the release of records upon a finding of
public interest, even though the need to delete such a finding was one of the primary reasons
for amending the Public Information Section of the APA. See, e.g., 37 Fed. Reg. 69, 70 (1972)
(amendment prohibiting the release of certain types of information by the Department of
Agriculture which would "adversely affect the public interest"); 36 Fed. Reg. 1893-94 (1971)
(amendment stating that the Department of Labor will make material available only if it
furthers the public interest). But see 36 Fed. Reg. 11440 (197 1) (amendment deleting the require-
ment that persons applying to the FCC for the release of general material not routinely available
must submit a statement of reasons and facts supporting the applicant's need). For criticisms
of the former .practices of the FCC see 1969 Duke Project 77 and 1970 Duke Project 169-70
n.30.
107. 450 F.2d at 677 n.24. Limitations as to use and further dissemination would seem
particularly difficult to implement. It is impracticable for the court to supervise the plaintiff's
activities; and as the quantity of information released to an increasing number of parties
expands, it will be increasingly burdensome on any given agency to insure compliance with the
court decision. While the court made no express reference to this problem, it may have taken it
into account when assessing the qualifications and, implicitly, the integrity of the plaintiffs.
108. 315 F. Supp. 175 (D. Md. 1970), noted in 1970 Duke Project 181.
109. 444 F.2d 21 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
[Vol. 1972:115
ADMINISTRA TIVE LA W-1971
compiled for law enforcement purposes and thus were protected from
disclosure by the investigatory files exemption.1 0 Both the district and
the circuit courts construed the exemption narrowly and rejected that
contention, but they relied upon slightly differing theories. The lower
court analyzed the purpose of the exemption and found it to be the
prevention of premature discovery of the Government's case in a law
enforcement proceeding."' Release of the information was ordered
because it was already in the hands of the potential defendant and,
therefore, the Government could not be further disadvantaged by
disclosure to the public.
In contrast, without stating that it was doing so, the circuit court
subtly shifted the focus of its inquiry to an analysis of the function
which the documents fulfilled." 2 The court characterized the letters as
"records of official enforcement actions" 3 rather than information
gathered during an investigation, reasoning that a warning letter is a
vehicle used to gain voluntary compliance and is often the final step
in the enforcement process. As such, it would not come under the
protection of the investigatory files exemption. This decision substan-
tially narrows the scope of the exemption by limiting the definition
of "file" to information which is actually a product of the investiga-
tive process."' When coupled with Bristol-Meyers Co. v. FTC,"5 an
important 1970 case holding that if enforcement proceedings are not
"imminent" the investigatory file must be disclosed, the two Wellford
decisions greatly narrow the scope of the investigatory files exemp-
tion.
Two important policy considerations, however, were not presented
in those cases: protection of personal privacy and protection of an
110. "[l]nvestigatory iles compiled for law enforcement purposes except to the extent
available by law to a party other than an agency." 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7) (1970).
111. See H.R. REP. No. 1497, at 11; S. REP. No. 813, at 9.
112. Wellford v. Hardin, 444 F.2d 21 (4th Cir. 1971).
113. Id. at 24-25.
114. An unresolved question is to what extent must records be kept solely to facilitate the
purposes of the FOIA. For example, might the Department of Agriculture keep only a record
noting that a letter was sent warning of a possible violation? Information could thus be so
limited as to be meaningless to a person attempting to reconstruct the event to which the record
refers. A related question is the length of time such records should be kept. Routine disposal
might be accelerated so as to remove as soon as practicable records thought by the agency to
be sensitive without regard to public use.
115. 424 F.2d 935 (D.C. Cir. 1970), noted in 1970 Duke Project 180-84. See also 38 U.
CIN. L. REv. 570 (1969).
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informant's identity. When these considerations were actually con-
fronted, the resulting decisions produced judicial disharmony con-
cerning the construction of the exemption. In Cowles Communica-
tions, Inc. v. Department of Justice,' plaintiff sought the release of
a file compiled by the Immigration and Naturalization Service on
another individual, claiming the information was needed to defend a
libel action. Cowles, relying on Bristol-Meyers, argued that since no
proceedings were pending, the file should be disclosed. The court
erroneously expressed doubt as to whether Bristol-Myers would sup-
port such a holding, and stated that even if it would, Bristol-Myers
would not be followed. Expressing concern for the right to privacy of
the person who was the subject of the file, the court refused to order
disclosure, stating that it was "unthinkable that rights of privacy
should be jeopardized further by making investigatory files available
to private persons."117
The visceral feeling expressed by the Cowles court finds some
support in congressional debates on the FOIA."5 However, it was the
personnel and medical files exemption"' which was intended to pro-
tect personal privacy, not the investigatory files exemption. The inves-
tigatory exemption was included only to prevent a party in litigation
with the Government from gaining earlier or greater access to investi-
gatory files through the FOIA than he could through discovery.2 0 The
applicability of the investigatory exemption, therefore, should be
determined by an analysis of the function of the file in question, not
of its contents. The applicability of the personnel and medical files
exemption, in contrast, is determined by the intrinsic nature of the file
in question.
The primary purpose of the exemption for "personnel and medical
files and similar files"'' is to protect citizens from unwarranted dis-
closure of highly personal information submitted to or gathered by
an agency.12 Such information is ordinarily not of the nature which
116. 325 F. Supp. 726 (N.D. Cal. 1971).
117. Id. at 727. The court made no attempt to criticize or distinguish Bristol-Myers.
118. E.g., 111 CONG. REc. 26820-21,26823 (1965);112 CONG. REc. 13659 (1966).
119. "[P]ersonnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute
a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy." 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6) (1970).
120. See H. R. REP. No. 1497, at 11; S. RaP. No. 813, at 9.
121. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6) (1970).
122. H.R. REP. No. 1497, at ii. See S. REP. No. 813, at 9. See notes 101-07 supra and
accompanying text.
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citizens need to know in order to oversee agency activities. Had the
Cowles court realized that the Immigration file might have been ex-
empted as "similar files," personal privacy could have been protected
and this conflicting interpretation of the investigatory files exemption
thereby avoided.
In Evans v. Department of Transportation,123 the Court of Ap-
peals for the Fifth Circuit refused to enjoin the FAA from withhold-
ing the name of an informant which was contained in an investigatory
file compiled nearly eleven years earlier. Information concerning
Evans' mental fitness and ability as an airline pilot had been confiden-
tially communicated by the informant to the FAA in reliance upon
an explicit pledge that the informant's identity would not be re-
vealed.124 The narrow holding of the case is not troublesome. The
FOIA provides that an agency may withhold any record specifically
exempted from disclosure by another statute.1 5 The Federal Aviation
Act permits such information to be withheld whenever disclosure is
not required in the public interest and would adversely affect the
interests of the informant.1 2 As the Evans court held, the name of the
informant was clearly exempt under this statute. However, the court
unnecessarily went on to hold that nondisclosure was also justified by
the investigatory files exemption since, in the court's opinion, the pub-
lic interest in air safety demanded that the investigatory functions of
the FAA not be crippled by making such persons reluctant to come
forward with information. 127 The decision is weakened by its failure
to discuss the holding in Bristol-Myers Co. v. FTC,2 1 which makes
no provision for the problem of informants. It is probable that infor-
mation from informants will be reduced if agencies are unable to
promise nondisclosure of their identities, and Congress has not yet
123. 446 F.2d 821 (5th Cir. 1971), petition for cert. filed, 40 U.S.L.W. 3265 (U.S. Nov.
24, 1971) (No. 71-698).
124. In Commercial Envelope Mfg. Co. v. SEC, 29 Ad. L.2d 764 (2d Cir. 1971), the court
dismissed an appeal taken from an SEC refusal to disclose an allegedly libelous letter. The court
noted that an appeal taken to a court of appeals pursuant to § 9 of the 1933 Securities Act, 15
U.S.C. § 77i (1970), was improper. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(c) (1970).
125. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3) (1970).
126. 49 U.S.C. § 1504 (1970). See generally HOUSE COMM. ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS,
86TH CONG., 2D SESS., FEDERAL STATUTES ON THE AVAILABILITY OF INFORMATION (Comm.
Print 1960).
127. See S. REP. No. 813, at 824 n.l.
128. 424 F.2d 935. See note 115 supra and accompanying text. See also 38 U. CIN. L. REv.
570 (1969).
Vol. 1972:1151
DUKE LAW JO UR VA L
provided a protective statute for every agency as it has for the FAA.
The only solution is to either carve an exception to Bristol-Myers, as
the alternative rationale of Evans does, in effect, or to find a source
of protection outside the Act such as the "informant privilege."'' 2
III. HEARINGS
A. RIGHT TO A HEARING
The Supreme Court in Goldberg v. Kelly' held that under the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment a welfare recipient must
be afforded an evidentiary hearing prior to the termination of bene-
fits, regardless of a statutory provision requiring a post-termination
"fair hearing."' 2 After an initial determination that the right-privilege
distinction 3 was not applicable to the receipt of welfare benefits, the
Court applied the traditional balancing test 4 to the cohipeting inter-
ests at stake.5 In striking a balance the Court enumerated the interests
on the one side as the fundamental necessity of such payments to the
eligible recipient, and the interests of the state in insuring the general
welfare of its citizens.' The opposing interests which favored termina-
129. This has been described as the Government's privilege to withhold the identity of
persons who furnish information of violations of laws, subject to judicial limitations dependent
upon the needs of the defendant. Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 59-60 (1957). See
Stewart & Ward, FTC Discovery: Depositions, the Freedom of Information Act and Confiden-
tial Informants, 37 ANTITRUST L.J. 248, 258 (1968). See also Comment, An Informer's Tale:
Its Use in Judicial and Administrative Proceedings, 63 YALE L.J. 206 (1953).
1. 397 U.S. 254 (1970), noted in 49 J. tRB. L. 186 (1971); 23 U. FLA. L. REV. 422 (1971).
2. 397 U.S. at 259-60 & n.5.
3. See Reich, Individual Rights and Social Welfare: The Emerging Legal Issues, 74 YALE
L.J. 1245 (1965); Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964). See generally Van
Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law, 81 HARV L.
Rv. 1439 (1968).
4. Justice Frankfurter first outlined the factors to be weighed in determining whether a
particular proceeding was unfair, emphasizing the need to balance "the hurt complained of and
good accomplished." Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 163 (1951)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring); accord, Cafeteria Workers Union v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886
(1961); Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420 (1960); Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474 (1959).
5. ". . .consideration of what procedures due process may require under any given set of
circumstances must begin with a determination of the precise nature of the government function
involved as well as of the private interest that has been affected by governmental action."
Cafeteria Workers Union v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961). See also Joint Anti-Fascist
Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 163 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
6. 397 U.S. at 264-65.
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